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Abstract 
This thesis has its point of departure in the changes in research policy that have happened in 
Europe lately. The focus is on the Danish Act on inventions at public research institutions, 
which provide public research institutions with an opportunity to patent research results. The 
objective of the Act is to increase the transfer of research results to industry. This thesis 
investigates if patents of public research institutions have a positive impact on technology 
transfer, an assumption that comes from studies showing that patents are in many industries 
used to coordinate the collective process of innovation. It is shown that the transfer of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) is in most cases accompanied by a transfer of know-how 
through collaboration or other personal interaction. The patents of public research institutions 
are in many cases primarily used for exclusion, though this varies depending on the industry, the 
type of research results and the strategy of the firm. The coordination effect of patents on the 
transfer from public research institutions to industry is not significant, since this coordination is 
mainly done through the networks of the researchers. The coordination effects that do come 
from patents are related to the strategies of firms, not to the research collaborations. The thesis 
does not reach a general conclusion as to whether patenting has a positive impact on technology 
transfer, since this depends on the industry and research results in question.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. New rationales for and trends in technology transfer policies 
In 2000 the Presidency of the European Union (EU) presented a strategy for economic growth 
within a knowledge-based economy. Better policies for research and development (R&D) was 
part of the strategy for making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world. A goal was set to increase public investment in R&D to 1% of each 
country’s GDP (European Council, 2000). This possible increase in public spending intensified 
the debate on how publicly funded research can best lead to increased innovation in local (or 
regional) industry, and to increased welfare.   
 
Economists agree that innovation is depending on the science base on which it draws, and that 
this science base is to a large extent coming from the publicly funded research at universities 
and publicly funded research institutions. Until 1980 the policy in the U.S. was partly guided by 
the idea that this science should be published and made freely available for all to use (See 
Nelson, 2004), and until recently the same principle had been prevalent in Europe (Pavitt, 2001). 
The rationale behind this policy was economic arguments in favour of the public interference in 
the production of science. Knowledge is viewed as a public good. First of all it is non-rival in 
use, which means that once produced it can be dispersed at an insignificant cost. If it is not made 
available, there is a welfare loss, because two persons can use the same knowledge without 
diminishing the value for each other. Secondly, and related, knowledge is non-exclusive. It is 
not easy to exclude others from using it, once it is produced, which creates problems of free-
riding. If the producer of knowledge cannot exclude others there is too little incentive to invest 
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in knowledge production, since it is possible for others to free-ride. Both characteristics of 
knowledge are assumed to lead to underinvestment in R&D, if left to the market.  
 
The answer to the issue of non-rivalry has in several countries been publicly funded production 
of science, which is made openly available for all to use. At the same time the knowledge 
produced by the private sector is made appropriable by the patent system, which grants owners a 
temporary monopoly in order to counteract underinvestment. This is the economic rationale for 
the traditional situation where publicly produced knowledge is made freely available while 
privately produced knowledge is protected by patents (Pavitt, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Penin 2005).  
 
But changes in legislation are blurring this distinction between open, publicly funded science 
and proprietary, private science. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 made it easier for U.S universities 
and research institutions to patent their results. European research policy is to a large extent 
inspired by this legislation, and in many countries open, public science is no longer an ideal 
(Nelson, 2004).  
 
The belief behind the Bayh-Dole Act is that patenting leads at the same time to more applicable 
research, more transfer to industry and increased income to the research institutions (Mowery et 
al., 1999). Denmark has recently passed similar legislation. The Danish legislation passed in 
1999 obligates researchers at universities to report their inventions, allows institutions to take 
over the rights to the invention, and the institution must investigate the commercial potential of 
the invention (Danish Act on inventions at public research institutions). The only clear 
assumption expressed in the Danish legislation is that the act will give public research 
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institutions incentives to transfer results, and that clarity of who owns the inventions will make 
transfer easier.  
 
An evaluation of the Danish Act on inventions at public research institutions concludes that the 
institutions are good at protecting intellectual property rights (IPR). At the end of 2003 some of 
the universities had filed a large number of patent applications, according to the evaluation at a 
level comparable to similar efforts abroad. But the number of commercialisations (measured in 
number licences, sold patents and spin-out firms) was not satisfactory, and it was concluded that 
the institutions needed to improve their commercialisation efforts (Ministry of Science 
Technology and Innovation, 2004).  
 
International empirical investigations of the role of IPR in industry show that the relation 
between patenting and transfer of technology or knowledge is more complex than apparently 
assumed in the evaluation. Studies of technology transfer between and within firms usually 
operate with a distinction between tacit and codified knowledge, the first being know-how, the 
second easily transferred information (Amesse & Cohendet, 2001). Transferring codified 
knowledge might not give the recipient any value, if the skills needed to make use of the 
information is not transferred as well (Callon, 1994). Studies also suggest that the view on 
patents as a way to exclude others from using a technology might be too simple (Penin, 2005). 
These studies show that patents are not only, and sometimes not even primarily, used to gain a 
monopoly status, as assumed by economic theory. Patents both protect and disclose knowledge. 
When a patent is granted, it reveals the details of the technology and gives the holder the right to 
exclude others from using this knowledge. But in many industries patenting is not the most 
common way of assuring revenues from an innovation. When firms are asked, they list patents 
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very low as a means of appropriating an innovation. From this follows that many firms have 
other reasons for applying for patents than those originally assumed. One of these reasons is that 
patents can ease collaboration between firms. Patents signal competences, they can induce firms 
to reveal knowledge (since it is protected) and they can ensure division of rights to research 
results. Patents are an important tool when it comes to collaboration in research and transfer of 
technology between firms (Penin, 2004). 
 
This thesis looks into how patenting of the research results of public institutions is influencing 
the transfer of knowledge to industry. The point of departure is the traditional assumptions 
behind research policy as well as some of the more recent assumptions behind the changes in 
policy that have been occurring in Denmark and other European countries following the 
American Bayh-Dole Act. These assumptions have not only been questioned by economists as 
indicated above, but also from theoretical schools within sociology of science that suggest a 
different view on the innovation process. I will examine to which degree the different views on 
patents and technology transfer cover the situation of Danish public research institutions and the 
firms that use the results, and I will show that the theoretical elements are missing some 
important nuances.  
 
First, the use of patents is very dependent on the industry and the type of research result in 
question. Secondly research collaborations are a very important part of the technology transfer 
and most transfers of IPR are accompanied by personal interaction between the researchers 
behind the invention and the firm. The third point I will show is, that firms in some cases want 
exclusivity to the research results of public institutions in order to invest in their further 
development, but this depends on various factors, most importantly how the result fits into the 
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firm’s strategies. Finally I will show how the use of patents as coordination devices is not 
central in the relation between industry and public research institutions. The technology transfer 
is guided by the networks of researchers and the uses of patents as coordination devices that are 
present in industry, relates to the business strategies more than to innovations.   
 
1.2. Research question 
 
Does patenting of research results produced by public institutions have a positive impact on the 
transfer of knowledge to industry through research collaborations? 
 
1.3 Outline of the study 
 
The economic rationale that used to guide research policy has been loosing more and more 
ground, as the policies have changed in the U.S. and Europe. The changes in the Danish 
legislation have so far not lived up to the expectations of the architects behind the law, and it is 
conflicting with a traditional understanding of how economic efficiency is best achieved in this 
field. I will look at some of the assumptions behind the changes in legislation, and on some 
additional theoretical accounts of how technology transfer and patents function, in order to 
evaluate if the economic efficiency which was pursued in the former legislation has lost in 
importance or been outweighed by some of the positive effects that might be expected when 
additional theoretical and policy rationales are considered.  
 
This question contains a normative element in so far that I will search for a positive impact of 
the new legislation. The notion of socio-economic benefit that lies behind the economic theory 
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that has inspired earlier research policy will serve as the guideline for whether or not the effect 
can be seen as positive.  
 
Looking for socio-economic benefits might be done through a quantitative study involving some 
sort of comparison either in time or between countries. For example, the evaluation of the 
Danish Act was made partly by counting licence agreements, sold patents and spin-out firms. 
However, in this study I focus on showing the multiple roles which patents can play in the 
process of developing and commercialising new products, and the study therefore adopts an 
exploratory rather than quantitative approach.  
 
This thesis will investigate how patents work in the relation between industry and public 
research institutions, and not only whether they work in the same manner as they do in industry. 
The study is guided by theory, but its main element is interviews with people who work with the 
relation between industry and public research institutions, in order to get a detailed picture of 
how patents function.  
 
1.4. Design 
 
Chapter 2 offers an elaboration of the original economic case for public funding of science. I 
also include some critique of this case and elaborate on the use of patents as coordination 
devices in industry. In chapter 3 some alternative views on science production are presented: 
some are a direct critique of the traditional economics, some of it serve as an elaboration of 
central concepts from this. Chapter 4 presents the changes in policy towards protection of public 
science and some details of the Danish legislation that are needed to understand how the 
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technology transfer in Denmark works. Chapter 5 presents the approach to the empirical 
analysis, summarising the theoretical assumptions from chapters 2-4, and explaining how the 
central concepts are operationalised. Chapter 6 is divided into subjects according to the 
empirical findings and the elements from theory they are compared to. In chapter 7 the findings 
are discussed in relation to the theoretical rationales presented in chapter 2. Chapter 8 is the 
conclusion, summing up my findings, discussing the quality of the results, and presenting 
recommendations for further research on the subject.  
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Chapter 2: The Traditional Economic Case for Research Policy 
 
2.1 Science as a public good 
The notion of science as a public good has served as rationale for a system where some science 
was publicly funded and laid out into the open, while other could be protected through the 
patenting system in order to be appropriable. The idea that there are good reasons for public 
interventions in the production of basic science has been around for a while (the concepts of 
basic and applied science will be discussed in section 2.2.). In 1959 Richard Nelson argued that 
there are externalities to basic research, and in 1962 Kenneth Arrow stated that the output of 
basic research is information, and that this is costly to produce, but almost costless to use and 
reproduce (according to Pavitt, 2001). One central concept is rivalry, which refers to whether or 
not there is competition for the use of a good. If a person uses some information, this will 
typically not affect the value of the information for another person using the same information. 
The cost of reproduction is therefore very low since for example an article or a conversation can 
in principle make it possible for another person to consume the same information. If a specific 
piece of information is demanded at the price of the production of an additional unit, but not 
supplied at that price, there is a welfare loss.  
 
The second central concept is excludability, which relates to whether or not the holder of a good 
can prevent others from using that good. Sometimes the concept of appropriability is used 
instead, since the importance of excludability has to do with the fact that a non-excludable good 
has no market value, since others are able to use it for free. Non-excludability will reduce the 
incentive to invest in knowledge production, since others can free-ride on the investment. If 
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there are no legal measures that make it possible to protect information, it can be used by 
anyone as soon as it is revealed. The non-rivalry and non-excludability properties of science will 
therefore lead to underinvestment if the production of science is left to the market (See Callon, 
1994; or Nelson 2004, for a detailed discussion). This theoretical argumentation serves as the 
rationale for some policy recommendations that have been followed in many countries (Nelson, 
2004), and which are central to this thesis. One recommendation is to publicly fund science and 
publish the results to make them available for all to use. Openness and public investments 
address the issue that science cannot be supplied at a socio-economically efficient level by the 
market1, by allowing the same scientific result to be used by several persons without lessening 
the value for the original user. Another policy recommendation that follows from the 
characteristics of science is that legal measures should make it possible for private producers of 
science to exclude others from using it. This makes it easier to appropriate science and increases 
the incentive to invest in science production (see Nelson 2004 and Pavitt, 2001).  
 
2.2 The distinction between basic and applied science 
It is somehow contradictory that economic efficiency is best achieved by both ensuring 
appropriability by legally establishing property rights, and on the other hand producing freely 
available science. This can partly be explained by introducing the very common distinction 
between basic and applied research (in for example Pavitt 2001) or between science and 
technology (in for example Nelson, 2004). It is usually assumed that public research is basic, 
meaning that there is no clear idea of its application, that it involves higher uncertainty, and that 
it requires significant additional investment to be marketable. It is therefore assumed that basic 
research will not be supplied adequately by the market, because of these associated (and/or 
                                                 
1
 Two other points that are made to justify the public funding of science is that science involves great uncertainty, which 
causes underinvestment, and that science is a durable good, i.e. it needs no continuing investment (Callon, 1994).  
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defining) properties. The research that is done by private firms is the applied part. The use is 
predictable, the results will be sellable, and it is therefore assumed that this is the kind of 
research that is and should be patentable (Nelson, 2004).  
 
The discussion of basic vs. applied science is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is a central 
part of the general discussion of patenting and public funding of science, because policy is 
changing towards less publicly funded basic science (Pavitt, 2001). However the distinction 
between basic and applied science is an important one, in order to understand the innovation 
process and the technology transfer from public research institutions to industry. I will return to 
this issue later, when I discuss the science-technology relationship in section 3.4.  
 
2.3 Patents as coordination devices 
In the above discussion patents are referred to as a way to increase the incentive to invest in 
R&D, because they make it easier to appropriate science and innovations. There is, however, 
empirical evidence showing that patents in industry have other functions than this, which seem 
to be important for collective innovation in industry. I will discuss these additional functions to 
be able to assess, later on, if they play a similar part in the technology transfer from public 
research institutions to industry as they do in technology transfer processes between firms.  
 
The classic economic rationale behind patenting is that granting a patent allows the holder of the 
patent to appropriate monopoly rents for a limited period of time. Penin (2005) starts his critique 
of this view by stating that:  “Patents are not central to appropriating the returns to R&D in 
most industries” (Penin, 2005, p.9). He refers to a number of studies that conclude that firms do 
not think that patents are efficient to secure a monopoly and that they are not a necessary 
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condition to make an innovation profitable. This has been shown for different industries, 
countries and time periods. The exception is industries that involve chemical based knowledge, 
the examples given are pharmaceuticals, organic and inorganic chemicals, petroleum, and 
plastic materials. In his study of the biotech sector Penin (2004) concludes that patents are used 
primarily to protect know-how, but that patents also give the holder bargaining power and ease 
different steps of the collaboration process.  
 
Since the number of patents granted has increased, Penin and the authors he refers to conclude 
that patents have other values than appropriation2. There are several ways in which patents 
facilitate coordination among firms, and this is important because innovation processes do not 
occur in an isolated firm, but involves different actors (Penin 2005).  
 
Penin’s first important point is that patents are disclosing as well as protecting knowledge, as is 
also stressed in the traditional view on patents. But this patented (and therefore disclosed) 
knowledge does not seem to be very valuable to other firms, since they will rather acquire 
knowledge by hiring employees, by attending conferences and by looking through scientific 
publications, than by scanning patent databases. In Penin’s opinion this is because the patent 
publication is only disclosing codified knowledge, and that a broader know-how is needed in 
order to imitate an innovation (Penin, 2003). Penin’s point is that firms can obtain a description 
of an innovation from a patent publication, but they are not able to exploit it commercially and 
this is what allows the patents to function in a logic of coordination as well as the before 
mentioned logic of exclusion (Penin, 2005). I will later return to this discussion of the value of 
codified and tacit knowledge. 
                                                 
2
 Penin lists other reasons that he believes can be part of the explanation for this increase in patenting, but for my 
purpose it is enough that it is substantiated that the following reasons are important to firms.  
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Penin presents four ways in which patents can function in a logic of coordination: First of all, 
patents can signal where competences are located. If patents disclose information on the tacit 
knowledge of the firm, they can enable firms to find collaboration partners, hire bright students 
and attract investments. Secondly, patents help technology trading, since a patent allows firms to 
show what knowledge they have, without risk of imitation, and subsequently sell the rights to it. 
Thirdly, patents prevent firms from being blocked in their research. When technologies are 
overlapping and innovations are incremental, other firms might have important patents in the 
field of interest. By gathering a patent portfolio, a firm has something to trade with, in case they 
end up infringing other patents. The fourth and last option is that patents ease collaboration 
among firms, which is of particular interest, since such a function of patents might also be 
working between industry and public research institutions, if patents have the same functions 
here as in industry. In early stages of the collaboration patents can help firms find the right 
partners. Even if no valuable knowledge is disclosed, a patent show that the firm might have 
valuable know-how in that area. According to Penin the patent can give the firm a more 
favourable bargaining position on setting up the terms of the collaboration. The protection 
dimension of patents also work in favour of collaborations, since firms are more willing to share 
there intellectual assets in a collaboration if they are protected from a partners possible 
opportunism by a patent. Finally, the outcome of research collaboration can be shared by the 
partners through a joint patent application.  
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Chapter 3: Alternative Views on the Production of Science 
 
The notion of science as a public good and of the use of patents as coordination devices comes 
from within the discipline of economics. A critique of this view has come from the sociology of 
science, but has been partially accepted by many economists.  
 
3.1 Science as a quasi public good 
Michel Callon criticises the idea of science as a public good and contributes to a more detailed 
understanding of how science is performed. He argues that the appropriability of science or 
information is depending on the strategies of various agents. For example the patent system can 
make science appropriable and firms can keep their knowledge a secret in order to avoid free-
riding. Secondly, non-rivalry is not necessarily a feature of science, since a lot of investment is 
required to make use of science. A certain piece of information will only be interesting to a very 
limited number of agents, since the investments needed to make use of the information are very 
specific. A scientific statement is useful only if a person knows the related scientific statements. 
And instruments and the skills to operate them are needed to confirm the statement, and 
subsequently to develop anything useful from the statement. A significant investment is 
therefore needed to make use of knowledge. In the case of a closely knitted scientific 
community some of the capacity to use the knowledge might already exist, and the cost might 
therefore be lower, which is why Callon uses the concept of a local public good.  
 
Callon concludes that science is not non-rival and in-appropriable in itself. The degrees of 
rivalry and appropriability “are the outcome of the strategic configurations of the relevant 
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actors, of the investments they have already made or are thinking of making” (Callon, 1994, 
p.407). I do not agree that science is no different from other goods when it comes to the level of 
rivalry and appropriability. Even if a scientific statement has no value without a significant 
investment, it is still the case that the statement, if published, can be of use to others without 
reducing the value for the original user3. But Callon’s observation that there are degrees of 
appropriability and rivalry, depending on the context, is interesting. This is in line with Penin’s 
understanding that various legal elements and the strategic decisions by firms are relevant for 
the importance of patents in a specific context. That specific parts of science are only relevant 
for a limited number of actors is also interesting for the study of industry-public research 
institutions relations. These points will be discussed in my presentation of the empirical 
evidence. Callon has other interesting observations in his critique of science as a public good, 
and I will present the ones I find useful for my purpose in the following. 
  
3.2 Tacit and codified knowledge 
According to Cowan et al. (2000) economists have come to use the concept tacit knowledge as a 
residual for all knowledge that is not codified, even if it is a concept that has roots within the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. The authors argue that tacit knowledge is important to the 
discussion of technology policy, because it is the codified knowledge that has the properties of a 
public good. If it is the tacit knowledge of the innovating firm that is the source of the monopoly 
power, the traditional case for the patent system vanishes (Cowan et al., 2000).  
 
Callon starts his discussion of the properties of knowledge, by discussing the economist’s view 
of science as a good. In the sociology of science this notion, that is so self-evident to 
                                                 
3
 This is with the exception of cases where science provides the original user with a monopoly.  
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economists, needs to be explored and explained further. When economists treat science as a 
good, they see it as an object that can be exchanged. Science is reduced to information, which in 
the definition chosen by Callon is “knowledge reduced to messages that can be transmitted to 
decision agents” (Callon, 1994, p. 398). In Callon’s interpretation of this, a message can be oral 
or written statements, and in any case it presupposes a material base. This base could be a 
human being, a substance, a machine or a product. For the message to be information, it needs to 
lead to an action. In economic terms this means that it needs to have value for the user receiving 
it. Callon distinguishes between codified and incorporated knowledge. The codified knowledge 
is standardized and easily transmitted, stored and reproduced. Incorporated knowledge (which is 
close to the concept of tacit knowledge) is inscribed in human bodies, instruments or machines. 
Callon extends the idea of tacit knowledge mentioned earlier, since incorporated knowledge also 
comprises technical automata embedded in machines and instruments. In this interpretation 
incorporated knowledge becomes the craft of science – all the instruments and skills needed to 
perform scientific activities. Incorporated knowledge is a good, as is codified knowledge, 
though it is, per definition4, not as easily transmitted.  
 
The distinction between tacit and codified knowledge is important for this study, both in the 
discussion of whether science is a public good that should be publicly funded and dispersed 
openly, and in order to understand what inputs are important for firms in the innovation process. 
I will work with Callon’s definition in the following (though he uses the concept “incorporated 
knowledge”). Callon’s concept and critique of “science as a public good” is tied together with 
an understanding of scientific networks, and I will present his thoughts on this in the following.  
 
                                                 
4
 It is not Callon himself who brings transferability into the definition of tacit or incorporated knowledge, but e.g. 
Lundvall & Johnson (1994) and Nonaka (1991) uses the transferability as important for the distinction between tacit and 
codified knowledge.   
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3.3 Scientific networks 
 
Callon’s work includes Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 2001), which proposes to view 
science as a network. The network is a hybrid of technical networks (i.e. interconnected objects) 
social networks and the networks of statements (e.g. discourses). Callon gives the network of 
Einsteinian physics as an example. This network would include:  
 
“Articles, books, and textbooks that present and circulate its constitutive statements…[,] the equipment 
and machines in which it is inscribed, …skills embodied in human beings…[,] and the institutions that 
support and develop it: laboratories, government agencies, universities…” (Callon, 1994, p. 412) 
 
In a short description of ANT Callon (2001) describes how this theoretical approach goes 
beyond the distinction between structure and agency. The theory does not conclude on which 
determine the other, but deals with the networks of agents, artefacts and meanings that is the 
object of study. Usually the purpose of this approach is to show how these elements and their 
relations are socially constructed (Callon, 2001), and the focus would often be on how science is 
evaluated, i.e. who (or what) decides what counts as facts. These aims of this theoretical 
approach are not relevant for this study, but the idea of how different elements (artefacts, human 
beings and institutions) are needed to perform R&D seems to me to be a useful approach to 
understanding the workings of patents in the relationship between public research institutions 
and industry. I will focus on identifying the elements and strategies that are important for the 
role of patents in the analysis of my empirical data.  
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3.4 The science-technology relationship 
 
As referred to earlier, I will now explain why the distinction between basic and applied science 
is important for this study. It has been shown that technological advance is faster in fields that 
are strongly supported by public science (Nelson, 2004). Part of the investment needed to use 
science is being done by the publicly funded institutions, and given away in form of published 
research results which can serve as a basis for further advance. But a factor that might be even 
more important is that public research institutions teach scientific results and train students in 
practicing research. The kind of research done by public research institutions is important for 
what kinds of skills the recruitment base of industry ends up with (Pavitt, 2001). The idea that 
industry does applied research, in which basic research is an input, is important for the 
technology transfer to industry, and in the debate on the changes in research policy, the issue of 
whether basic research is useful to industry and should therefore be publicly funded takes up a 
large share (see Pavitt 2001 and Nelson, 2004). It has been shown that there is a correlation 
between strong public research in a country and the innovative strength of its national firms. 
Several scholars argue that there is a myth among policy makers that the U.S is leading in 
innovation because of their ability to do applied science and transfer it to industry, and that the 
EU is behind in innovation in spite of strong public science. This is shown to be incorrect, in 
most fields of study (See Pavitt, 2001; Dosi et al., 2005; Mowery et al, 1999). For the purpose of 
this study it is important to keep in mind if the research provided by public research institutions 
is the kind that is needed by industry. The observation that strong basic research leads to 
innovation might point to another picture of the research and innovation, namely that basic 
research is followed by applied research done by firms. Nelson points to the fact, that there are 
many cases in which application of a technology has come before an understanding of the 
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processes involved (Nelson, 2004). It has also been shown that the idea that universities do basic 
research (in the meaning: research done to understand phenomena, without thought to possible 
application of the results) is not, and has not been empirically sound (Nelson, 2004 and 
Etzkovitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). This point is important for technology transfer, because the 
value of university research is depending on the applicability in industry; however it cannot be 
assumed that what is labelled basic science is not useful for industry. I will leave it to the 
empirical evidence to define what the relevant properties of basic and applied science are 
(sometimes the concepts used are science and technology, depending on whether the discussion 
is focused on university research or on research done in industry).  
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Chapter 4: Changes in Policy 
 
4.1 New developments in policy 
For quite some time it has been questioned if (basic) research should still be publicly produced 
and dispersed openly. According to Pavitt the debate in the 1970’s in the U.S included 
arguments that other countries might free-ride on the open public research funded by the state 
(Pavitt, 2001). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 made it easier for U.S universities and research 
institutions to patent their results. Part of the reasons for the legislation is that it gives the 
institutions an incentive to more applicable research and more transfer to industry. This is to 
assure that there is an economic benefit from the investments in science. An increased income to 
universities from their research is also an opportunity to reduce public investments (Mowery et 
al., 1999). 
An additional rationale behind the Bayh-Dole Act is that the research results from universities 
require substantial further development to be turned into a new product. Firms are more willing 
to invest in this development if they can get exclusive IP rights to the results (Kneller, 1999)5. 
This relates to the nature of the patented results. The traditional case for publicly funded 
research was that information can be used by anyone, without damaging the benefits of the 
original users. In a market situation, a firm will try to protect its knowledge or product, since its 
income from this would be reduced if a competitor started using the same thing. But if publicly 
funded research is basic research that should be used as a basis for further development (Nelson 
argues that it is so), would the benefit for one firm decrease, if another firm used the same 
                                                 
5Kneller (1999) brings forward this point in a description of the Bayh-Dole Act and there is no further explanation of 
the assumption. The reasoning is therefore not necessarily a political rationale behind the legislation, but the author’s 
view that this is a beneficial effect of the Act. 
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information? This is likely, if the development would follow the same path, and the firms would 
end up with competing products. If, on the other hand, there are many paths in which to move 
from a discovery, firms might not be willing to pay for exclusivity – and if they would, it is only 
leading to a welfare loss, since they have incentives to use the knowledge even if it is available 
to others.  
 
4.2 The Danish Act on inventions at public research institutions 
The first section of the Danish Act on inventions at public research institutions is as follows:  
“It is the purpose of this Act to ensure that research results produced by means of public funds 
shall be utilized for the Danish society through commercial exploitation”.  
(Act on inventions at public research institutions, English version, section 1). 
The Act is a part of a larger initiative to make publicly funded research useful in industry 
(General Remarks for the Act on Inventions at Public Research Institutions).  
 
The Act applies to inventions made by an employee as part of his or her work for an institution. 
The institutions are: universities, public research institutions, hospitals and medical research 
institution under a county or Copenhagen Hospital Corporation. The Act states that the right to 
inventions belongs to the employee, with the limitations stated in the law, and that the institution 
is entitled to transfer the rights to an invention to itself. Employees must report to the institution 
if they make an invention. An invention is defined as an invention or creation that can be 
patented. Within two months from the notification, the institution must appraise the potential for 
commercialisation, protect the rights to the invention and discuss the possibilities for exploiting 
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these rights commercially with the employee. If the institution has taken over the rights to an 
invention they have the duty to actively see too that the rights are made useful.  
 
If the institution has taken over the rights to an invention, and the invention is used 
commercially, the employee is entitled to a fair economic compensation. If the employee, by 
agreement with the institution makes commercial use of the invention, then the institution is 
entitled to economic compensation. The institution can decide not to commercialise and patent 
an invention, if an employee finds that there are special ethical reasons for this. The institution 
can pay for activities related to transfer and protection of rights to an invention and the income 
from transfer of rights to inventions can be used for activities within the purposes of the 
institution.  
 
The remarks to the Act contain, among other things, the purpose of it, similar laws abroad, and 
an elaboration of each section of the Act6. The institutions are meant to make use of external 
patent agents or innovation clusters7 to commercialise results. Furthermore it is not the objective 
that the institutions build up their own patent portfolio, “…except for within a few strategic 
areas” (General Remarks for the Act on Inventions at Public Research Institutions, p.3, my 
translation).   
 
Commercial exploitation and utilisation of inventions are the main motivation behind the Act. 
Firstly, the government considered that uncertainty about the rights to inventions have been a 
                                                 
6
 These remarks, along with for example other work that led to the creation of the bill, the debate before the passing of 
the bill in parliament, and possible administrative practice, are parts of the law on inventions at public research 
institutions. In the Danish legal system these parts (and others) might be considered in case of a ruling on the basis of 
the law (Zahle, 2001). Since my purpose is mainly to discuss the ideas behind the Act, and not all the details of how the 
law works, I will only discuss the remarks here. 
7
 Innovation clusters are publicly supported agencies fostering collaboration arrangements between research institutions 
and industry in an area. 
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barrier to utilisation of results. Secondly, the universities had no incentives to help employees 
commercialise inventions when they were not entitled to a share of the income from these 
activities. Previously, it was optional to help employees protect and commercialise results, and 
therefore only a few institutions had capability to handle patent and property rights issues. 
Without such capabilities, the institutions had few possibilities to gain a fair price for their 
intellectual property rights, and the absence of a professional market for such rights was 
impeding the transfer of inventions from institution to firm8.  
 
Foreign legislations on inventions at research institutions are described, and out of these Great 
Britain, France, the Netherlands and the U.S. have legislation that grant the institution the right 
to the researchers’ inventions. Therefore it seems fair to conclude that these have served as an 
inspiration for the Act.  
 
The main assumptions behind the Danish Act are thus first, that uncertainty about ownership has 
held back commercialisation, and second, that an economic incentive will increase 
commercialization. It is also an objective that the university gets a fair price for the invention, 
but it is not clear what this means, and if this is expected to contribute significantly to the 
income of the university. There is no mentioning of science as a public good, which in itself has 
reason to be financed by the state. Whichever the economic argument behind this change in 
legislation, it is clear that it is expected to increase commercialisation of the research results 
from public research institutions that are worth patenting9.  
                                                 
8
 A point that is worth noting is that the Act is giving equal rights to employees at universities and at publicly funded 
research institutions. Employees at research institutions used to be under the law for “inventions by employees”, by 
which the employer can take over the rights to the employee’s invention. Teachers and “scientific” staff at universities 
used to be exempted from this rule.  
9Here it should be noted that not all of the reported inventions are sought patented. Researchers are obliged to report 
anything that is patentable – and information of what this means is posted on institution websites. Since the institutions 
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4.3. Evaluation of the Act 
In 2004 the effect of the Danish Act on inventions at public research institutions was evaluated 
(Ministry of Science, Technology and innovation, 2004). In the period from 2000 to 2003 the 
public research institutions filed 284 patent applications and 133 agreements on transfer of 
rights were made with industry. The transfers are licensing agreements, sold patents or spin-out 
firms, referred to as commercialisation10. The evaluation concludes that Danish research 
institutions have the same level of patenting (adjusted for size of research budget) as in other 
European countries11, but very modest commercialisation results. The recommendations of the 
evaluation is that the institutions should learn from the ones that are doing well (DTU and 
Risoe), and the conclusion is optimistic since there are signs of improvement.  
 
The evaluation includes statistics, questionnaire survey and interviews, both with researchers, 
institutions and firms, and the focus is on the legal, economic, organisational and cultural 
aspects of the work of the institutions. These aspects are important to understand how the 
transfer works, but the evaluation’s sole focus on transfer of IPR is the inspiration for this thesis 
to look more broadly at how patents function in the relations between firms and public research 
institutions, since patenting might lead to e.g. other collaboration arrangements12. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
have only taken over rights to 60% of the inventions (on average, form 2000-2004) (Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Innovation, 2004), there is a selection process going on. This contains among other things a market analysis of each 
reported invention (General Remarks for Act on Inventions at Public Research institutions).  
10
 I believe that the issues related to the technology transfer in spin-out firms are different from the ones related to 
technology transfer to established firms, and I have not pursued these issues further in this study. 
11
 Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Germany. These countries are chosen because comparable studies are available. 
12
 The evaluation contains the results (patents and commercialisations) for each research institution. Only 21 of the 
Danish Research institutions are dealt with in the evaluation, because they where the ones receiving economic support 
for the implementation of the Law. From the interviews done for this thesis it became evident that much has happened 
since the evaluation was concluded, so the figures are no longer relevant. The evaluation has served to select the 
institutions in the Copenhagen area, which have been most active in patenting and commercialising, for interviewing. 
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Chapter 5: Approach to the Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Theoretical framework  
 
Above I have summarised different theoretical discussions that I see as relevant to the study of 
the role of patents in technology transfer. In this section I will outline how each of the elements 
fit into the study.  
 
First, I presented a theory that deals with knowledge as an economic good and with how the 
market for knowledge is best organised. The normative aspects of this theory are related to how 
socio-economic efficiency is best achieved by different policy measures. I will use this 
argumentation to discuss whether or not the impact of the Danish legislation is positive.  
 
Second, empirical studies by economists have demonstrated that patents can function as 
coordination devices. The results from these studies will guide my search for the influence of 
patents in university-industry relations. Since my subject of study is exploring various possible 
influences it is not fruitful to set up hypotheses and test them in a quantitative manner and as I 
will show in the analysis many of the workings of patents in this public-private setting are quite 
different from what can be assumed from the studies.   
 
Approaches from the sociology of science offer a more detailed understanding of the science-
technology relationships, and discuss the concepts of knowledge and innovation in depth. This 
provides further elements to understand the workings of patents in technology transfer.  
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5.2 Empirical Data 
 
My empirical data is foremost semi-structured interviews. I have interviewed 4 persons (one 
answered by e-mail) from the offices handling technology transfer in public research 
institutions13.  
 
Table 1: Informants from public research institutions (for more details, see appendix I) 
Based on interviews and web pages of the institutions (see Bibliography for list) 
Name Type Field of research Patents*** 
HS Hospital Corporation Medical 33 
KVL University Agriculture, veterinary science 10 
KU* University Science, humanities, social science 37 
Risoe** National laboratory Alternative energy sources and 
plants 
33 
*The informant answered by e-mail 
**Risoe does contract research and is only partially public funded 
***Number of patents and patent applications by end of 2003 (Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, 2004) 
 
All the TTOs are in or around the Copenhagen area, and they were selected because they were 
the ones that had the most patenting activity according to the evaluation of the Act (Ministry of 
                                                 
13
 Some of these offices have other functions than technology transfer, in some cases it is not the main function, 
however I will refer to them as Technology Transfer Offices, TTOs. 
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Science, Technology and Innovation, 2004). I got information from four out of nine institutions 
in the Copenhagen area, and those four are among the most active in patenting14.  
 
I asked all the informants from TTOs for names of firms that they collaborated with. I specified 
that I wanted to talk to firms where the collaboration had involved agreements about patents. 
Three TTOs gave me names of firms and/or contact persons15. I arranged interviews with 4 
firms around the Copenhagen area, all larger firms, based in Denmark but operating 
internationally. All of the firms invest significantly in R&D and none of them specialise in 
selling research (their income from sales of licenses is insignificant). All four are mainly 
business-to-business firms. 
                                                 
14
 The most active institution is The Technical University of Denmark (DTU), which has informed me of firms they 
have collaborations with, but did not have time for an interview. I contacted one other institution, which informed me 
that they do not transfer their results to industry, and the three remaining institutions had less that 5 patents each, 
according to the evaluation of the Act. 
15
 This method of choosing informants could be referred to as a sort of ”snowball” or ”network” sampling, where 
relevant persons are found through first informants’ network (Neuman, 2000) 
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Table 2: Informants from firms (see appendix I for details) 
Based on interviews and web pages of the firms (see Bibliography for list) 
Name Business Employees R&D* Remarks 
Haldor 
Topsoe 
Engineering/ 
catalysis 
1600 15 % The firm was mentioned 
by both DTU and Risoe  
NKT-
research 
Photonics & 
nanotech 
n.a. n.a. NKT-research handles 
patents for several small 
firms in the NKT group. 
NovoZymes Biotech/ 
enzymes 
4000 13% The firm was mentioned 
by DTU, KVL and 
Risoe 
Chr. Hansen Biotech/ 
ingredients  
2500 6-7% The firm was mentioned 
by KVL 
* Percentage of turnover 
 
The TTOs mainly mentioned names of large well-known firms (as the ones I interviewed are), a 
few smaller ones were mentioned as well; some of these were spin-out firms. The firms I 
interviewed are not necessarily representative for the firms that TTOs collaborate with. Some 
TTOs would not name their collaboration partners without consulting them first, and other 
TTOs asked me to get permission from the firms before printing their names. Two of the firms I 
talked to have references to the collaborations with specific institutions on their websites.  
 
The interviews followed two interview-guides, one for firms and one for TTOs (appendix II). 
Both interview-guides where redone after the first interview to open up for more options. The 
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interviews were recorded (see appendix II for details) and a summary was sent to the informant 
for approval and they were asked to correct any misunderstandings. The interviews were in 
Danish, the quotes are my own translation.   
 
5.3 Interpretation of results 
 
I will treat the information from the interviews as factual descriptions of the work and strategies 
of the organisations to which the informants belong. The TTOs were asked about their own 
activities and to assess the strategies of the firms they work with. The latter was to learn the 
strategies of a larger number of firms than the ones I talked to directly. The firms where asked 
about their collaborations with and strategies towards public research institutions. On some of 
these points they were also asked the same questions about collaboration and strategies directed 
at industry; this was in order to see if the firms use patents in coordination with other firms, as 
the studies presented in chapter 2 show that most firms do. In a separate chapter (7) I will 
discuss the results in relation to the economic recommendations presented in chapter 2.  
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Chapter 6: The Role of Patenting in Research Collaboration 
 
I will now present my empirical findings and look closer at how the explanations given by the 
elements of theory presented above relates to these. The analysis is divided into themes 
according to the assumptions derived from theory.  
 
6.1 Variation among industries 
 
According to theory, patents are in most industries not used solely, maybe not even primarily, to 
exclude others from using a firm’s technology.  Some industries (chemical industries, maybe 
biotech) are considered exceptions to this, but generally, the theory does not detail major 
variations in the use of patents by referring to other factors than industry. Different from this, 
the variation in use of patents among industries is very significant in the cases I studied, and 
other factors seem to play a major role. The public research institutions interviewed do not 
specialise their research within one field, and they were therefore able to comment on the issue 
of variation among industries and in relation to other factors.  
 
The informant from KVL found that the use of patents is very industry-specific and depends on 
the type of invention. Within some types of inventions (the example was cancer research) a 
patent is the way to commercialise an invention, while in other cases (a DNA marker was the 
example) the firms just wants to be allowed to use the invention. 
 
The informant from Risoe mentioned a difference between some of their research results and 
results from research in biotech. On the subject of whether or not research would be used less if 
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it was published and not patented, some of the results within Risoe’s field of research would be 
used at least as much if it was not patented, in the opinion of the informant. But biotech results 
and research within some of Risoe’s areas where a lot of investments are needed before the 
product is ready for the market, are mentioned as examples where the results might not be used 
if they were published openly.   
 
TTOs also mentioned that differences in size of firms can be important for technology transfer. 
Informants from KVL, Risoe and KU state that it is a political goal to collaborate with firms of 
all sizes. Risoe collaborates with both small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large 
firms, but mention that the SMEs are underrepresented when it comes to transfer of results. The 
informant from Risoe said that most firms need research collaborations to use the results they 
buy licences for, except for some larger firms which have the expertise themselves. KVL is in a 
different situation: They sell licences to both small and large firms, but their research 
collaboration is mainly with larger firms. Both TTOs want to include the smaller firms more, 
but the informant from Risoe also said that collaborations with smaller firms often do not count 
(in evaluations), since they do not include a licensing agreement. She also said that the type of 
research they do at Risoe is too abstract to be of use to the smaller firms. These points suggest 
that size of the firm might be important for the usefulness of the patented results and know-how 
of public research institutions.  This says nothing of whether size counts in the firms’ use of 
patents, but in the discussion of how patents work in technology transfer from public institutions 
size may be a factor. In the studies of how firms use patents in different industries, the variation 
related to size of firms should thus also be checked for.  
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The informants from the firms also had opinions on the differences of use between industries. 
The informant from Haldor Topsoe made the following statement: “Buying licenses is not very 
common within our field, but it is in the pharmaceutical industry, since there are firms 
specialising in selling their research results”. Whether or not the informant’s evaluation of the 
pharmaceutical industry is justified, the statement suggests that the trading of research results is 
not the common factor that determines why patents are used as a means of exclusion in chemical 
based industries, including the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
In the interview with the informant from NKT I specifically asked about differences in the use 
of patents in different industries. The answer focused on the market situation: “The differences 
in strategic handling of patents are not only dependent on the industry; they are related to the 
competitive situation”. By this the informant meant that with some technologies a patent 
covering a large market (the example was the U.S.) would keep firms from using that 
technology, even if they could do it in other countries. With other technologies competing firms 
would be happy to imitate, even if it was only possible in a single country. In the industry of 
NKT the use of patents might also depend on the industry life cycle. The informant explains that 
the use of patents to exclude is more intensive in emerging markets. I will elaborate on this in 
the section on the exclusion function of patents.   
 
The studies presented in the theoretical chapters give no explanation of why some industries are 
different in their use of patents than others. The size of the firms in the industry, the maturity of 
the market and the propensity to trade IPR could seem to be relevant factors. Furthermore there 
is a difference in the use of patents according to the type of results from public research 
institutions, even though the results are within the same field of research. My material does not 
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allow generalizing about the influence of these factors, but the fact that the use of patents is 
more differentiated in the institutions and firms I talked to than assumed by theory is important 
for my findings, and I will point to these differences in the following.  
 
6.2 The nature of technology transfer 
 
Behind my assumption that patenting influences technology transfer in a positive way by 
facilitating collaboration between firms and public research institutions, there is an 
understanding that technology transfer is more than the transfer of IPR. I found that in most 
cases the transfer of IPR is accompanied by a transfer of know-how; however a surprising 
finding is that the collaboration in some cases comes before the patenting and the licensing 
agreements.  
 
Patents as a result of research collaborations 
From the theory on how patents are used in industry, I expected that patenting might lead to 
collaborations. Instead, both public research institutions and firms indicate that a significant 
transfer of IPR takes place after or during a research collaboration surrounding the technology in 
question.  
 
All four TTOs told me that some inventions are made in research collaborations with firms. In 
answering the question on what interest firms show in the patented inventions the informant 
from KU answered: “…most agreements start as research collaboration agreements (as 
mentioned above) where collaboration can result in some interesting research results”. The 
statement above which the informant refers to, is that the contract for a joint research project 
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includes an agreement on how it will be handled if the collaboration leads to patentable results. 
The informant from Risoe provided a similar clear statement, and the informants from HS and 
KVL mentioned similar situations. At HS “patents and contacts are often developed at the same 
time” and the informant from KVL mentioned (as answer to the question “how do firms feel 
about the terms for agreements?”) that “A regular research collaboration can create a 
discussion in some cases, namely because of IPR. If an invention comes from the collaboration, 
what happens then?” My questions did not systematically focus on how often inventions and 
patents are the outcomes of research collaborations. However, for two of the TTOs more than 
half of the inventions seem to be made this way, and it happens for the two others as well. 
Further research would be needed to establish how often inventions are developed in this way.  
 
The informants from the firms confirmed that inventions made in collaboration with public 
research institutions are an important part of the knowledge they receive from the institutions. 
All the firms I talked to answered that their collaboration with public research institutions 
typically or often involves Ph.D. or master students. One informant estimated that 50% of the 
inventions to which they take over the rights are made during research collaborations (Chr. 
Hansen). The informants all mentioned that they ensure that they will have access to results that 
might come from these collaborations. According to the informant, Haldor Topsoe uses 
“industrial researchers”. He is referring to a project under the Danish Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation called the “Industrial PhD Initiative”. The ministry gives subsidies 
to both the university and the firm, so that part of the Ph.D. student’s wage is covered. The aim 
is to  
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“…educate PhD researchers with knowledge of business aspects of research and development; 
to establish personal networks for the exchange of knowledge…; to enhance the development 
and innovation of Danish trade and industry”. 
(www.erhvervsphd.dk/visArtikel.asp?artikelID=531) 
 
This is one of many options for firms and public research institutions to collaborate involving 
Ph.D. students (see Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, 2000 (in Danish) for some 
other possibilities). For NKT the collaborations are within the NKT Academy, a collaborative 
effort between NKT and public research institutions (see www.nkt.dk/academy), where NKT 
supports Ph.D. students. All the informants from the firms give examples of different types of 
agreements that involve Ph.D. or master students who do research within areas that interest the 
firms and who are somehow sponsored by the firms. In return the firms have the possibility to 
buy licenses or take over rights to any inventions that come from the collaboration.  
 
The informants from both TTOs and firms confirmed that the agreement on collaborations also 
involves a part about what to do with the results that might come from the project. In some cases 
it is discussed by which persons or on the basis of whose knowledge the invention was made 
(the informants from KVL (TTO), Novozymes, and Chr. Hansen mention this), in order to 
establish who owns the rights. For other informants it is the public research institution which 
owns the rights, but the firm will make sure to be the first to be offered access to the inventions 
(Informants from Risoe (TTO), Haldor Topsoe and NKT did not mention that the ownership of 
the rights are discussed, but they did mention that terms for transfer to the firm are discussed). In 
many cases where the university owns the rights from a joint research project the firm will only 
take over part of the rights to the invention. Informants from Risoe (TTO), Haldor Topsoe and 
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Novozymes mentioned examples of this. The firm will get the rights to the relevant fields of use 
and the geographical areas of interest. Sometimes the firm will only share the cost of the parts 
they want (according to the informant from Risoe) in other cases the firm can pay for the 
application, but only get the rights for part of it (the informant from Novozymes mentioned 
this).  
 
In conclusion, a significant part of the inventions that public research institutions file patent 
applications for are made in collaboration with firms. In these cases, the Act on inventions has 
not changed much seen from the point of view of the firms, since earlier the researcher from the 
public institutions would own the invention and get compensated by the firm. I cannot say 
whether the incentives in the Act for the TTOs increase collaborations, but in the cases where 
the patents owned by public research institutions come from a collaborative process, the 
patenting option for universities may work as an incentive to foster collaborative processes (I 
will return to the question of the sharing of the results through joint patent applications in a later 
part). Since some of the inventions owned by public institutions have been made without the 
involvement of the firm, and since some of the results from collaborations are owned by the 
institutions, the question of to which extent a licence agreement is a transfer of knowledge or 
solely a transfer of rights still remains.  
 
Knowledge transfer and the transfer of IPR 
I have asked the informants if firms need know-how as well as IPR, when they are interested in 
patented results. The answers confirmed that collaboration with researchers is valuable; however 
in some cases it is more important than in others. The informants also gave some accounts of the 
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types of personal interaction between the researchers of institutions and firms, and some points 
to the type of knowledge that is shared.  
 
In most cases the firm that is interested in a research result will also be interested in the work of 
the researcher in some form. All the informants from the TTOs answer that the firms are often 
interested in contact with the researcher. The informant from KU said: 
 
“The researcher/inventor usually knows a lot more about his/her invention and the area than the 
company and will therefore have to work with the company for a while. He or she will also often 
have to supply material, further results, etc.” 
 
The informant from HS had other examples of why the researcher is used:  
“It is often a provision in the contract that the researcher behind the patent is “made 
available”. This can be as a member of the board. Often the researcher is part of the deal as a 
consultant. The firm can be interested in the researcher’s description of the course of events that 
lead to the invention.”  
 
Risoe’s license agreements will almost always have a research and development agreement tied 
to them. Often the firm will use Risoe facilities as well as the researchers in the further 
development of the results. The informant from KVL said that selling exclusive licences to a 
firm can create a partnership:  
 
“Because often nothing will come of the invention without the inventor. The firms need to work 
with the inventor in order to develop the invention. There will typically be some form of 
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agreement on the further development of the invention, and this is what creates the 
relationship”.  
 
In Risoe the researchers are not allowed to do private consultancy work, and the agreement will 
therefore not be with the specific researcher. This is allowed at KVL, but the informant reckons 
that: “They can do consultancy work, but an invention is so research intensive, so it is nothing a 
researcher would do at the firm, without the participation of KVL”. Also the TTO would need to 
be contacted because they manage the rights to the invention.  
 
One of the TTOs gives a more detailed description on the firms’ needs for know-how to 
accompany the results they buy. The informant from Risoe said:  
  
“There can be some larger firms that are able to do it on their own. For example a large 
German company, they bought some licenses for three patent families, which are supplementing 
some of their own technology.” 
 
In the informant’s opinion this does not depend on the field of research which the results are 
within, but on the firm. From the quote it is likely that it is the technological strengths of the 
firms involved. In another context the informant explained that Risoe mainly makes license 
agreements with larger firms, because “they have the R&D departments and they can handle it” 
 
The firms confirmed that know-how is often needed along with the IPR. They added the 
possibility of hiring the researcher for a longer period of time. The informants from NKT and 
Chr. Hansen both told that the firms are interested in the know-how of the researchers if they 
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find some interesting inventions. They will either set up research collaborations or hire the 
researcher for a shorter or longer period of time. According to the informant, Haldor Topsoe has 
only once bought a license for a result that was already patented, and from the context it is not 
likely that the informant meant a result from a public research institution. And when asked if the 
firm would hire the researcher if they found some interesting patented results, the informant 
answered that the firm has not done that, and that their experience with research results from 
public institutions is not big enough for him to say if it is a possibility. The informant did state 
that a good scientist is seen as more likely to bring new knowledge to the firm than patents and 
scientific publications, but for this firm it can only be concluded that the licenses and rights to 
inventions they do buy are accompanied buy know-how, since the inventions in question are 
developed in collaborations involving Ph.D. students from public research institutions.  
 
Two of the firms explain how much knowledge a patent publication can give. The informant 
from NKT explains it quite clearly:  
 
“Patent publications can inspire us, and give us new ideas. But there is not much knowledge to 
gain from a publication. We cannot use it as if it was a recipe. It takes more to make it work.” 
 
The informant from Chr. Hansen was asked to compare scientific publications to patents in 
terms of which is more interesting for the firm. She answered that scientific articles are 
interesting for researchers because there are more details, while patents show commercial 
opportunities. I will return to the type of information that patents reveal, but from these 
informants it is clear that patent publications do not give the firms all the knowledge that is 
needed for the technology to be put to use in the firm’s research.   
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According to the informant form Novozymes, the firm has not to the best of his knowledge 
within the last couple of years bought licences from Danish research institutions, but he states 
clearly that the firm needs the know-how from the institutions in general. He describes the 
collaborations with researchers from public institutions as win-win situations because the firm 
has  
 
“…plenty of apparatus and money, and this mean that in the project that we have with the 
researchers we can offer a lot of technology platforms that they would not otherwise have 
access to. That means that they can move forward a lot faster on their project, and at the same 
time we can absorb their knowledge”  
 
When asked if a licence is enough, or they will need know-how as well, the answer is that it 
varies, depending on how central the technology is to the firm, but if they buy rights to 
inventions or licenses they will usually be willing to start a joint research project. Novozymes 
sometimes buys the apparatus and bring the researchers to the firm, but it is becoming more 
frequent, in the cases where the technology is needed for a shorter period of time, to pay the 
researchers to do the work at universities. 
 
Three of the firms mention that a lot of their researchers started out as Ph.D. students in the firm. 
Two mention this as a way to see if the person fits in at the firm. The informant from 
Novozymes did not see this as only positive, and he found that the firms should show restrain in 
hiring the good researchers, to make sure that industry are able to call on them again the next 
time they need it. With regards to the need for know-how the informant from NKT answered 
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that it is not necessarily more interesting for the firm to hire the Ph.D. students that have 
patented results, whether or not the person is interesting depends on whether or not the firm is 
focused on the business in question, and, as mentioned above, if the person fits in.   
 
Concluding, in most cases a transfer of IPR is accompanied by a transfer of know-how. In some 
cases it is because the transfer of IPR is a result of the combined know-how of public 
institutions and firms. In other cases the firms need know-how, which can be in the form of 
descriptions of the process, further results, and collaborations where the inventors work to 
develop the invention together with researchers from firms. Research facilities are also 
mentioned as useful to the firms. Some of the firms also hire researchers from public institutions 
after collaborations, but this is not necessarily in connection to transfer of IPR. Whether or not 
firms need know-how as well as the rights to use results depends (in some cases) on the firms 
own capabilities. Larger firms might be more likely to have the know-how to continue the 
research on their own, and if the technology in question is central to the firm, the firm might 
have both the apparatus and know-how that is needed.     
 
6.3 Patents as a means of exclusion 
 
Granting a firm the rights to exclude others from using a particular technology is meant to 
increase the incentive to invest in R&D. When it comes to results from public research 
institutions, firms can choose to buy simple or exclusive licences. The answers from my 
informants show that the answer to the question of whether firms want exclusivity or not and if 
so, why, is a very complex one. In many cases firms want exclusivity. I will start by showing the 
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answers that indicate this, but also some of the cases in which exclusivity is not important. 
Secondly I will refer some of the reasons firms gave for wanting exclusivity.  
 
Do firms want exclusive rights to inventions? 
A discussion of what is meant by exclusivity is needed before I present the evidence. In the 
evaluation of the Act on inventions (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, 2004) the 
concepts “sold patents” and “licences” are used. Different from this, the informants talk about 
the “transfer of rights”, “simple or non-exclusive licences”, and “exclusive licences”. I will use 
the concepts used by the informants in the following.  
 
It is interesting that when there is talk about the transfer of rights, this seems to mean that the 
firm get exclusive rights to some part of an invention, in terms of fields of use and geographical 
areas of use. The informant from Risoe said that an exclusive right is almost the same as a 
transfer. But sometimes the firms in this situation are part of the process of applying for a patent. 
The question of exclusivity is therefore complex, since it does not necessarily relate to granted 
patents, and since a patent (or the application) can be related to different fields of use and 
different geographical areas. In the following, the term “exclusivity” will cover all the cases in 
which the firm has the sole right to use a technology in an area (of use, or geographical), no 
matter how the transfer of the rights are done. I will also include some of the cases in which the 
exclusivity is related to the firm’s own research results, because some of the same reasons apply.  
 
All the TTOs give both exclusive and simple licenses to the firms. They all said that firms want 
exclusivity: The informant from Risoe said that firms almost always require exclusive rights to 
inventions; the informant from KVL could not say how often firms want it, but answered that 
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firms might only be interested if they are offered exclusivity; and from KU and HS the answers 
were that firms are interested in exclusive licenses. An interesting point is that the TTOs have 
different policies on whether to grant exclusivity. Risoe often gives exclusive rights, but for 
narrowly defined fields of use and geographical areas. KVL are willing to give the exclusive 
rights because it can create a partnership with more collaboration, the firm might sponsor Ph.D. 
students, and there will be no need to find other licensees. KU would also give exclusive 
licences, because it might increase the chance of the result being put to use. An exception from 
this is HS. They have the policy of not giving exclusive licences and they have only done it 
once, when it was a condition for making an agreement about the patent in question.   
 
The answers from the TTOs confirmed that the majority of firms that are interested in the 
research results of public research institutions would prefer exclusive rights to the results (in 
some form, see the discussion above). The informant from KVL called attention to some notable 
exceptions. There are firms who contact the TTO because they have heard of an interesting 
patented result. They will want access to the technology, unlike the firms that are contacted by 
the TTO, which might be interested in the technology, but will often require exclusivity. This 
point was illustrated by an example of a firm (the example is of a foreign laboratory and the 
informant did not mention whether it is a for-profit institution) wanting a simple license to a 
DNA marker16. The informant from Risoe had an opinion on biotech results as well: “There are 
not many simple licenses. The technologies here are different from for example biotech.”  
 
Another indication that industry is important is that HS (which has patents within medical 
research) has only given an exclusive licence once. This could be because they are reluctant to 
                                                 
16
 In molecular biology DNA markers are used to identify genes (www.wikipedia.org). 
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do it, but maybe exclusivity is not so important for the firms that they will give up on buying 
licences even if they cannot get exclusivity. Since many of the KVL results are within what can 
be categorised as the biotech field of research (see appendix I), it cannot be concluded that firms 
in biotech generally want simple licenses. But these statements do suggest that the area of 
research and type of invention is a very important factor in whether firms want exclusivity or 
not.  
 
All four informants from the firms confirmed that it is interesting for the firm to have exclusive 
rights to the results, but there are also some exceptions. Three of the firms explained that the 
importance of exclusivity depends on whether the technology in question is central to their 
business. For NKT it varies whether exclusivity is important. According to the informant it 
depends on the competitive situation, if an exclusive licence could keep competitors away, for 
example if it was protecting a whole range of products, it will be worth the extra cost. And if it 
is just one good way of doing things, they would often settle for the cheaper non-exclusive 
licence. The informant also mentioned that some products are protected better by patenting than 
others. If the market is small and the product has a limited lifetime, the firm would publish the 
result instead of patenting, to prevent others from patenting, but to save the cost themselves. 
This is in situations where the firm feels protected by the fact that the product is hard to make, 
so they do not expect competitors to catch up in time. The informant from Chr. Hansen 
mentioned that in the case of support technologies they would not need exclusive rights, but in 
the case of a patent that would be protecting an end-product it is important. The informant from 
Novozymes said that in the cases of technology platforms that are not central to the firm’s 
business it makes no sense to buy an exclusive licence. When asked if the maturity of the 
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invention in question matters, the informant answered yes, but there was no elaboration of this 
point. 
 
Why are exclusive rights to inventions interesting? 
Some of the indications on why exclusive rights to patents are important are also related to the 
use of patents as coordination devices, which I will present later on. Here I will mainly focus on 
how firms feel about protecting their development costs, securing a monopoly position, and 
excluding competitors.  
 
Part of the theoretical reasoning for giving firms exclusive rights to an invention is to restore the 
incentive to invest in development. This notion is confirmed by many informants. The informant 
from Risoe explains that “…the firms want an exclusive right if they are going to invest in 
developing a product, at least for some period of time.” And in her opinion the protection of the 
firm’s development costs is why it makes sense for public research institutions to patent results 
from a societal point of view. All four informants from the firms talked about the investments in 
developing results as an important reason for protecting or securing exclusive rights to 
inventions. The informants from Novozymes and Chr. Hansen both answer that the firms would 
not invest in developing a research result if there was a chance that a main competitor could get 
access to the same technology (but both say that the firm has not been in such a situation, since 
they are very careful to make sure that they will be able to get the exclusive rights they need 
before entering into a research collaboration). The informant from NKT said that the firms 
might refrain from developing a product if a competitor was doing the same, and mentioned the 
possibility of starting a joint research project with the competitor in question. Haldor Topsoe 
wants exclusivity to ensure that others are not developing the same results, and the informant 
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from NKT explained that owning a patent increases the chances of getting back what is invested 
in the technology in question.  
 
I asked the informants from both TTOs and firms how much they think needs to be invested in 
the inventions from public research institutions before it can be commercialised (by a firm). All 
the firms said that the results need a lot of further development to become a product or have 
commercial value. The informant from Novozymes estimated that 95 % of the development 
work comes after the patent application is filed. But both this informant and the one from Haldor 
Topsoe could not say if there is generally more development needed and more insecurity for 
public research institutions’ than for firms’ patents. And the question of how much further 
development is needed does not seem to be a question of whether the research is basic or applied 
(in the informants’ understandings of the terms). The informant from Novozymes estimated that 
the public research institutions patent fifty-fifty of applied and basic research depending on 
which institution it is. The informant from Haldor Topsoe was concerned that there will be less 
basic science (this concern was based on experience with foreign institutions that have begun to 
focus more on patenting) even though he mentioned that there is a lot of uncertainty involved in 
whether the basic research will turn in to a commercial product. It seems that the patented 
results are both basic and applied research, in the informants’ understanding of what this means, 
and that the firms will want exclusivity for those results. But they complain about the risks 
involved and are not willing to pay much for the rights.   
 
The TTOs confirm that a lot of investment is needed. But the informants form HS and Risoe 
said that there is a need for further investment even before a firm would be interested, and the 
institution has to work to reach “proof of concept” (the words of the informant from Risoe). And 
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after the transfer of rights has taken place a lot of work still needs to be done (as mentioned 
earlier this is often done in collaboration with the researcher or institution). For both HS and 
Risoe there has been a few inventions that could be used as they were, but the informant from 
Risoe explained that they were sold right away, and also that inventions that are ready for use 
might be so simple that they are not patentable.  
 
As shown above, all the informants see protection of development costs as an important reason 
to have exclusive rights to an invention, but when asked why exclusivity is important, the 
informants from the firms did not all give this reason as the first one, and it seems there are 
other interesting points to patents as exclusion. I asked the informants from the firms why 
exclusivity to a research result is preferred. The informant from Chr. Hansen answered that it 
gives opportunities in the market, the informant from Novozymes said that exclusivity might be 
interesting if the technology is central for business, and the informant from Haldor Topsoe gave 
the reason already mentioned: to protect development costs. The surprising answer to why 
exclusivity is important was given by the informant from NKT:  
“The main reason is that we want to draw up the patent application ourselves, to make sure that 
it is done right.” 
In another context she criticised the public research institutions for focusing too much on the 
technology and not enough on the business opportunities. And in an elaboration of the statement 
above, she said that a lot of questions have to be answered during the patenting process, and that 
the firm gives a lot of thought to how they can form the application in order to end up with the 
most valuable patent for their business. When questioned about whether the firm wants 
exclusivity to an invention that has already been patented, the answer was that in many cases the 
firm just want to be able to use the technology.  
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I also asked what the reasons for patenting are, and here the question of excluding competitors 
also came up. According to the informant, NKT wants exclusive rights to a technology for a 
period of time to gain a market share. For Haldor Topsoe the main reason is to have a monopoly 
for a number of years. The informant from Novozymes said that the far most important reason 
for patenting is to ensure freedom to operate, but the second most important reason is to prevent 
competitors from imitating and getting access to the specific market.    
 
The information given by firms on their own use of patents, show other factors that influence the 
role of patents than those assumed by theory. For NKT the use of patents is more intensive 
among firms dealing with emerging markets. Here there is more collaboration among firms to 
create the market, and the competition is focused on new products, not on prices. The 
established firms are competing on price and do have process innovations, but these are not as 
important to protect. The firms also give a lot of thought to their business strategies, and the use 
of patents is tightly connected to these. Protection of knowledge and exclusive rights are 
important in the areas that are central to the strategy, while in more peripheral areas the firms 
see no need to pay for exclusivity and would sometimes rather ensure their ability to use the 
knowledge by publishing, rather than patenting.   
 
Firms are interested in exclusive rights to inventions from public research institutions, but there 
are exceptions. For some types of inventions and in some fields of research it is not important 
for the firms. The importance also depends on the firms’ strategies, and where the technology in 
question fits into their own technology. If the technology is central to the firm’s business, 
exclusivity is important, if it is a support technology it is not. It might also be important for 
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firms to draw up the patent application on their own, since this is a task related to the firm’s 
strategies. When exclusivity is important to the firm, it is to increase the chances of covering the 
costs of the investment in development, and to keep competitors from central markets.  
 
6.4 Patents ease collaboration 
 
It was my assumption that patents can ease collaboration between firms and public research 
institutions by signalling competences to potential collaboration partners, protecting knowledge 
during collaborations and sharing research results. I found that the issue of the signalling effect 
of patents is not working as assumed, but is interesting in other contexts. The answers that 
disconfirmed the assumption give an interesting understanding of the workings of collaboration 
between firms and public research institutions, so I will discuss this as well. I also found that the 
issue of freedom to operate is not only an issue for the firms, since research institutions need to 
consider this as well.   
 
Patents do not help identify potential partners 
As I have showed a lot of the collaborations come before the patenting, but in the remaining 
cases firms do in many situations want to collaborate with the research institutions as well as 
buy a license to the results. My findings are that the firms rarely get in touch with research 
institutions on the basis of published patent applications and that they already know where the 
competences are located at public research institutions (and in the industry). In the case of 
research collaborations the network of researchers from firms and institutions (mainly 
established at conferences) is what is interesting.  
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To find out whether patented results lead to collaborations, I set out by asking the informant at 
HS (TTO) what the firms where interested in when they contacted the TTO regarding a patent. 
Since the answer was that firms rarely contacted the TTO, I turned to asking how the contact to 
firms was established, and if it happens that they are contacted by firms on the basis of a patent. 
The informants from Risoe and KU both answered that it is not very often that firms contact 
them because they have seen a published patent application. The informant from KVL said: 
 
“I don’t think they see our patents. No, that is not true, since we have been contacted by firms 
who are interested in antibodies, and have heard that we have a certain type. Or they have 
heard that we made a marker.”   
 
So in a few cases this is how the contact is established. But in other parts of the interview the 
informant said that the firms, which do contact the TTO without any prior contact are often 
interested in being allowed to use the technology, i.e. simple licenses, and this suggests that not 
many collaborations start this way.  
 
The TTOs have different ways in which they seek out potential licensees. In many of the cases 
where the TTOs need to commercialise an invention, the researchers will already have some 
contacts. The informant from HS mentions that in around half of the cases the researcher has a 
contact before hand (this might include the cases where the invention has been developed in 
collaboration with the firm), and he explains that a lot of the agreements are made with foreign 
firms, because the researchers have their contacts from conferences. The informant from Risoe 
answer that the TTO are not often contacted by firms, which have heard of an invention, but that 
they are often contacted after the researcher has been to conferences.  
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“[The researchers] are the best ambassadors. They are able to explain what it is about, and the 
ones that show up are able to understand it.” 
 
The researchers present their research in general, and not only the patented results, and when the 
firms contact the TTO, they are interested in the research in general, not necessarily in the 
patented results. The informants from both KU and KVL also say that their researchers 
sometimes have contacts that they use. In the cases where the researchers have no contacts, the 
TTOs will try to identify firms that might be interested. The informant from KU mentions that 
databases are used; the informant from HS says that the TTO might hire a firm to seek out 
interested firms or contact an innovation cluster. Risoe is developing a more radical procedure, 
where they will learn about the market conditions and see what kind of problems the firms have, 
so they will know where to focus their research.  
 
It seems that the firms in general do not look at the patents of public research institutions, unless 
they are contacted by the TTO or become aware of something through the network of 
researchers. When asked if the firm looks for patented inventions from public research 
institutions the informant from Chr. Hansen answers that  
 
“We are aware that there might be something interesting from there”, but she adds that it is 
“primarily through the networks of our researchers that we come to know of interesting results 
or if the results are published”.  
 
But the firm also has a recurrent search for interesting results that are patented, and then it does 
not matter if it is owned by firms or public research institutions. The informant from Haldor 
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Topsoe says that he has not seen any patents from one of the Danish research institutions the 
firm collaborate with. And the informant from Novozymes says about collaboration with 
academia:  
 
“…it is as far as I know very few partnerships that have started because we became aware of a 
patent. And we do not spend time looking at the website where they list their patents 
[www.techtrans.dk]. It would be a coincidence if we see those.”  
 
The patents from the public research institutions do not signal the competences of the 
researchers and the institutions to firms, since firms do not look at patents for that purpose. I 
will now present the answers from the firms on whether patents are valuable in identifying 
potential collaboration partners. Some of the answers are not only concerning public research 
institutions and research collaborations, but on the knowledge disclosure of patents in general. I 
will start by presenting the answers related to identifying collaboration partners and when 
possible, specify if the answer is related to public research institutions.  
 
All the informants from the firms said that their own researchers are central in the contact to 
public research institutions. When asked if patents are used to identify interesting researchers, 
the informant from Novozymes said that the firm knows most of the relevant researchers in 
Denmark, but internationally they also have a pretty good feeling for most of the strong groups 
of researchers from the areas within which the firm is specialised. And in the informant’s 
opinion it is not important if the researchers have patented results or not, because the firm also 
keeps up to date with publications. Patents might play a part in collaboration with industry. If 
the firm has a good idea, they will check for patents in that area, to make sure they have freedom 
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to operate. If another firm owns a patent in that area, they might be interested in collaboration (if 
the firm is not a direct competitor). At Haldor Topsoe they have not tried to find interesting 
researchers through patents of universities. The informant explained that when the firm looks at 
patents it is with regards to competition and that the researchers in the firm know the field, and 
who have what competences. The informant from NKT did not tell exactly how they find 
collaboration partners from universities, but when asked how the firms search for new 
knowledge she said that knowledge is easily accessible because everybody knows each other 
within their field of research. When it comes to identifying potential partners from industry, the 
IP department is only involved after the firms have established the contact, which often happens 
at conferences. The informant from Chr. Hansen said that the network is the most important and 
easiest way to identify potential collaboration partners, but both the researchers and the patent 
department need to know what is new in the field, and this knowledge is also used. Both Chr. 
Hansen and NKT use the patents in relation to potential collaboration partners, but not to 
identify know-how. In NKT, the IP department goes through the patents of the potential partner 
chosen by the researchers, to check if the firms are allowed to do what they do. For Chr. Hansen 
the patent portfolio of a potential partner is important if both firms bring technology into the 
collaboration. The firm will want to know that both firms have protected the technology in 
question, “to know where we stand from the beginning of the collaboration”. They do not expect 
universities to have their technology protected.  
 
An interesting addition to this point is that the informant from Risoe does see a signalling effect 
of patents. When asked if patents have a signalling value, the informant answered that having 
IPR makes the institution a more attractive partner. The examples she gave was when they apply 
for funding or look for collaboration partners in EU projects. But the patents do not signal 
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technical know-how, it is rather signalling that they have “…the competences and we have 
internal procedures and guidelines on how to handle [IPR]”. And this is important when the 
institution is evaluated in a project.  
 
Patents signal strategies and competences in handling IPR 
But even if the patents are not valuable to signal competences for public research institutions, 
they do disclose valuable information. All the firms I talked to have some sort of surveillance of 
the patents that are published within their field. For Novozymes it is important to know where 
the competitors are going, in case it is a business opportunity they would be interested in, but 
also to see if the competitors are moving so close to their field of technology that there might be 
conflicts under way. The informants from NKT and Chr. Hansen showed that they are aware 
that other firms try to discover their business strategies by looking at their patents, and that it is 
important for both firms to make this harder for the competitors. The informant from NKT said 
about the patenting procedure:  
 
“…it is fine with us, that the procedure is slow, it is only when we can see that someone is using 
our technology that we need the patent. Because as long as it is a patent application, the 
competitors cannot determine what is going to come of it, and that creates a lot of insecurity for 
them. On the other hand, we would like the patents of the competitors to be granted fast, so we 
know what we are dealing with.”  
 
The informant from Chr. Hansen says that the firm might file a patent application for a 
technology they are not interested in themselves, because the possibilities in that are among 
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other things: “to cover up where our focus areas are, the signalling value in having a portfolio 
and in filing patent applications.”  
 
This quote brings me to a final interesting point about signalling: Patents do signal competences, 
but in the cases I looked at, not competences related to research or knowledge, rather it shows 
competences in managing IPR. The informant from Chr. Hansen explained that the signalling 
was directed at customers, competitors and collaboration partners, but from the statement it is 
clear that it is not necessarily the real strategies and know-how that is revealed. For Haldor 
Topsoe the main signalling value is in relation to customers. The firm sells know-how 
licenses17, and the customer will not pay for that, if the firm does not have a license for the 
technology in question. Also continuous patenting within a field is showing that the firm is 
constantly doing new research.  
 
The contact between TTOs and firms that lead to collaboration is established through networks 
and the work of TTOs. Only in a few cases are the TTOs contacted by firms who became aware 
of their patents, and even then, the firm might have heard about it through researchers’ network. 
When the firms do surveillance of what is patented within their field, it is to know their 
competitors, and navigate their own strategies in relation to theirs, whether it is to make sure 
that they will not in the future infringe on competitors rights or to make sure that competitors are 
not infringing on their rights. Patents do have a signalling value when it comes to collaborations, 
but this is with regards to securing that the (already identified) potential partner has protected 
the relevant technology and knows how to handle IPR related issues. 
 
                                                 
17
 When they deliver a project to a customer it comes with a know-how license for the facility. 
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Patents are not essential to protect knowledge during collaborations 
I assumed that patenting gives firms more incentive to collaborate, because a patent will protect 
them from a partner’s opportunism. I have asked firms how they feel about this in general, not 
only in relation to public research institutions. All the informants from the firms said that they 
use non-disclosure agreements in research collaborations, this seem to be without exceptions.  
 
The informants from NKT and Chr. Hansen said that patents can be nice as an extra security, but 
none of the firms would enter into collaborations without a non-disclosure agreement. In the 
words of the informant from NKT: “We sometimes enter [into a research collaboration] with 
knowledge that is not patented, it might be our input to the process…. We often try to patent 
before, but it can be hard to make it happen, due to time pressure.” She added that a good 
relationship with the partner is very important, because non-disclosure agreements can be 
difficult to enforce. However she did feel that the fact that there is a non-disclosure agreement is 
a good protection of the knowledge. The informant from Novozymes explained that non-
disclosure agreements are needed because all the know-how cannot be protected by a patent, and 
the collaboration can only be fruitful if the parties are able to speak openly to each other. So 
both in the case of collaborations with public research institutions and with other firms, the 
firms I talked to do not consider patents to be important for protection of knowledge in research 
collaborations.     
 
Patents are used to share the results of research collaborations 
Another assumption was that patents ease collaborations, because they make it possible to share 
the inventions that might come of it by joint patent applications. All the informants (both form 
TTOs and firms) say that they have filed joint patent applications. The interesting difference is 
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that the TTOs (except for Risoe) think this is a good opportunity, while firms (and Risoe) will 
try to avoid joint applications.   
 
KVL answered that joint applications are interesting, because the firm would usually cover the 
patent expenses. The informant at HS see it as one of the TTO’s most important tasks to make 
sure that the research ends up with joint patent applications, while the informant from KU just 
told that it is common. Risoe’s answer looks more like the ones from firms: “We sometimes 
have no alternative, if we cannot determine what belongs to whom, but we do not like it. Patents 
are complicated, but co-ownership is worse.” 
 
The informant from NKT answers in relation to collaborations with firms that they would prefer 
to divide the results between themselves and the partner, and then give each other non-exclusive 
licences. This is because a shared patent can mean that decisions need to be made in agreement 
with another firm, potentially for the following 20 years. Novozymes files joint patent 
applications, and according to the informant it is really bothersome. The firm prefers to be able 
to decide where and when to file the patent application. Also there are many decisions to be 
made along the way, after the application is filed, and if the partner has different strategic goals, 
it can be hard to reach an agreement. In some cases Novozymes would rather give up the patent 
than file a joint patent application, but if the results are very important they will file anyway. 
The informant from Haldor Topsoe said that the firm is not interested in co-assignment or part-
ownership with institutions and they have avoided that by having the full rights transferred to 
the firm. Since their collaborations with firms are with customers, it is, according to the 
informant, decided that each firm patent what is within their core business area, and licences and 
royalty fees are agreed upon.  
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The firms try to avoid joint patent applications after collaboration with research institutions and 
other firms, both by agreeing on the terms beforehand (as briefly described in the section on 
joint research projects), by each party patenting a part of the rights and in some cases even 
giving up the patent. Therefore it cannot be said that the option to share results in this way is 
encouraging and easing research collaborations. Even though two of the TTOs have positive 
attitudes towards shared patents it is not likely that this encourages collaborations, since the 
partners seem to be working against their efforts on this point.  
 
Patents are used to ensure freedom to operate 
For some of the firms, ensuring freedom to operate is an important reason for patenting. Both 
firms from biotech mentioned this.  
 
When asked how important patents are to protect the firm’s knowledge, the informant from 
Novozymes answers that the primary reason for patenting is to ensure freedom to operate, i.e. to 
make sure that when they sell products, neither they nor their customers are infringing on 
someone else’s IPR. For Chr. Hansen the priorities are reversed, first of all they patent to protect 
their technology, but ensuring that they are allowed to do what they want is mentioned right 
after that. The informants from NKT and Haldor Topsoe do not mention freedom to operate as a 
reason for patenting18, but they do say that the option to cross-license is important, because they 
can be blocked in their research by competitors. Having technology to trade with is a cheaper 
way of being allowed to use a technology than buying licences (this explanation is given by the 
informant from NKT). Chr. Hansen uses patents for cross-licensing as well, and the informant 
                                                 
18
 I did not ask if this is this use is important to the firms.  
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said that having interesting patents “gives us some cards to play with. And the game these days 
is about patents, so you need to have them.” According to the informant from Novozymes the 
possibility to cross-license is important, because firms that are leading within a field of research 
will have the same knowledge, and at some point they might reach the same inventions 
independently of each other. If both firms patent, it is important to be able to negotiate, so that 
the firms do not block each others research.  
 
The informant from Novozymes mentioned that if a technology is not important for the firm, 
they might publish the results to prevent competitors from patenting, and as mentioned in 6.3, 
NKT does the same thing. Patenting is therefore not the only way of ensuring freedom to 
operate, publishing is a cheaper way of doing this. The advantage of patenting is that it allows 
for cross-licensing if others are operating in the same technology areas.  
 
The issue of freedom to operate is mostly related to firms. But it is actually important to the 
research institutions as well. The informant from Risoe has the most information about this. 
When they start research projects, which include an agreement that the firm will be able to buy 
rights to inventions that might come of it, Risoe needs to screen the projects, so they do not risk 
giving rights away to an important technology platform in a small research project that is not 
worth a lot of money. Risoe is only able to get funding for EU research projects if they have a 
partner from industry, and if the rights are transferred to a firm already, no other firm will be 
interested. Risoe can do further research, but without a partner this has no value19. The 
informant from KVL said that it is important for the institution to keep the right to do research 
                                                 
19
 In Denmark there is an exception to the patenting law, which allows researchers to use patented results in 
experiments and teaching, as long as this is not a commercial use. This exception is used differently in other European 
countries and the tendency is an increasingly restricted interpretation of the exception (Teknologiraadet, 2005).  
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within the field in question, and the informant from KU said that the TTO will only sell patents 
if they are not within the institution’s core research areas.  
 
An important aspect of patenting to firms is freedom to operate, which can be achieved by using 
patents as bargaining chips. With the increased patenting of public research, the TTOs need to 
keep in mind not to limit their own freedom to do research.   
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Chapter 7: Is the Impact of Patenting Positive? 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the implications that the empirical results above have for the 
theory-based rationales for research policy and the rationales behind the legislation in Denmark 
and abroad. First, I will look at the exclusivity issue, then on collaboration aspects, and finally 
on additional issues emerging from the evidence as measured against the theoretical 
frameworks. 
 
Exclusivity 
Granting a firm the right to exclude others from using a technology is acceptable if it provides 
incentives for investments that would not otherwise have been made. Most patented results from 
universities need a lot further investment to become useful products, and in many cases firms 
need exclusivity to take on the risk and the cost. But even if firms say they want exclusivity and 
sometimes demand it from the research institutions, this is not to say that the results would not 
be used if the firms are not given exclusive rights. The informants from the TTOs said that it is 
hard to commercialise the results, so the firms might be in a favourable bargaining position, 
where they are able to get exclusivity, even if they would, if needed, settle for a non-exclusive 
licence20. In collaborations it is usually agreed up front that the firm will be able to get exclusive 
rights. In addition there are some types of research results and some industries where there is not 
much need for further development or where firms seem to be willing to invest in the results, 
even if others have the option to do the same. The use of patents to keep competitors from 
                                                 
20
 Exclusive licences are more expensive, but several informants (both firms and TTOs) say that it is hard to reach an 
agreement on a price. Firms are not willing to pay much, according the firms because of the insecurity, according to one 
TTO it is also because they used to get it cheaper when the researchers owned results, according to another the firms 
feel they paid already, through taxes.   
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markets and the wish to draw up patents to be able to fit it to the firm’s strategy, are uses adding 
to the economic inefficiency, if this goes beyond restoring incentive to invest in the research in 
the first place. 
 
If a lot of investments are required to make any use of the result, the rationale for openness is 
not as strong, and my findings confirm that the results are very immature and it is very uncertain 
what will come of it (this is the traditional feature of basic science, even though some 
informants suggest that the inventions from public institutions are within applied science as 
well). On the other hand the groups of researchers within the research fields in question are quite 
tightly connected, and the leading firms and research institutions in an area have in some cases 
already made some of the know-how and apparatus investments. In that case the research results 
might be so interconnected with the existing technology of the firm, that further investments are 
less heavy, and the risk of another firm ending up with a competing product not big enough to 
keep the firm from investing. In this case allowing the firm to exclude others is adding to the 
welfare loss. My results show that both situations occur and the fact that many inventions are 
developed in collaboration between firms and public research institutions probably means that 
the firm has already made the basic investments necessary for using the results. However I 
cannot say which situation is more frequent, only conclude that in cases where the research is 
indeed very basic (immature and no clear view of applications) and within the core 
technological area of the leading firms within a research field, there is a welfare loss by 
excluding other firms from use (patenting and issuing simple licences might not produce a 
welfare-loss, but it conflicts with the idea that the research should be publicly funded).  
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An important point made by a TTO informant was that firms might want to patent results from a 
joint research project, even if they have no intention of commercialising the result, in order to 
exclude competitors. This practice is obviously against any of the arguments for socio-economic 
benefit of patenting.  
 
Patents ease collaboration 
My assumption that patents function the same way in the technology transfer from public 
research institutions to industry as they do between firms, is not substantiated. The technology 
transfer is in most cases accompanied by transfer of know-how, but patents are not significant in 
this process. Since the coordination between firms and public research institutions is mainly 
relying on networks, patents of public institutions work as a means of exclusion, the effect of 
which is described above.   
 
Other issues 
In the motives behind the change in U.S legislation I mentioned that part of the debate was on 
free-riding from other countries on the research paid by U.S. tax-payers. This does not apply to 
the Danish case, since all the TTOs collaborate with foreign firms as well. None of the 
informants from TTOs gave the impression that they give priority or better deals to Danish 
institutions, one said that they do not care whether the firm is Danish or not. The firms also 
collaborate with foreign research institutions, but one mentions that the foreign research 
institutions will give first priority to their own national firms.  
  
Another option I mentioned in relation to U.S. legislation is that the institutions can get an 
income from the technology transfer activities. When the evaluation of the act was concluded, 
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all the TTOs were receiving funding for their activities. I asked two of the TTOs if their 
activities are paying for themselves, and both said: “far from it”. One expects to reach break-
even in 3-5 years (HS) the other in 5-8 years (KVL).  
 
Since the income from patenting is not even paying for the technology transfer activities, the 
decision of transferring results to foreign firms can still be seen as allowing them a share of 
Danish investment in research. This is not necessarily a bad thing, one of the informants 
mentioned that an important task for public research institutions is to make Denmark visible in 
the international scientific community, because this is beneficial for the firms.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
My aim with this study was to see if patenting of public research results has a positive impact on 
the technology transfer through research collaborations. I have shown some of the ways in 
which patenting influences the collaboration with firms and some of the factors which seem to 
be important for this influence. I have also discussed whether these influences can be seen as 
positive, from the theoretical perspective. This conclusion first sums up the results of the study, 
then the discussion. I will finish by discussing the validity of my results, and present some 
recommendations for further studies.     
 
8.1 The role of patents in the relation between industry and public research institutions 
 
This study set out to explore if the transfer of IPR from public research institutions to firms is 
accompanied by a transfer of know-how through personal interaction and if so, if this transfer is 
eased by coordination effects of patents.  
 
First, I found that the role of patents is depending on the strategy of the firm, of the field of 
research or industry and on the type of research result. This finding is supported by several 
examples from the informants, but these do not show a coherent picture. However, though a 
pattern cannot be established, it is clear that there are differences in the way patents are used, 
among industries, within industries, and within firms.  
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Second, in most cases the transfer of IPR provide considerably more value to firms if it is 
accompanied by a personal contact between researchers to allow for transfer of tacit knowledge 
or know-how in addition to the codified knowledge. In some cases research collaboration 
precedes the transfer of IPR, in other cases the transfer of IPR is followed by a joint research 
project, consultancy work done by the researcher or short or long term employment of the 
researcher.  
 
Third, the firms using the research results from public research institutions do rely on patents to 
exclude others from using the technology, but this is not the only use, and there are situations in 
which exclusion is not important. Firms want exclusive rights to research results because they 
want to make sure that they get back the money they have invested in development of the result. 
The general wish for a monopoly position and the chance to exclude competitors from a market 
is also prevalent. In the case of research results made by public research institutions that are not 
yet patented it is valuable for a firm to draw up the patent application itself to make it fit its 
strategies. The cases in which firms do not find it important to have exclusive rights to results is 
when the technology in question is not central to the firms strategies, for example if it is a 
support technology. The market situation can also mean that exclusivity is not important, 
because sometimes lead time can prevent competitors from imitating. There are also some types 
of research results where exclusive rights are less important to firms.   
 
Finally I have explored the role of patents in collaborations from an assumption that they enable 
firms to find relevant partners by signalling competences, protect a firm’s knowledge in research 
collaborations, and enable the sharing of research results from collaboration. Collaboration 
partners are identified through the networks of researchers and these networks even help point to 
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the interesting patents of public research institutions. Patents do reveal information, but not in 
relation to research. Rather, the firms use patents to monitor the strategies of their competitors. 
Patents are important for firms when they consider potential collaboration partners, but this is 
with regards to whether the potential partner has protected the relevant knowledge and has the 
ability to handle IPR issues. For a research institution showing ability to handle IPR can be 
important, in attracting partners and because patenting is what counts in EU evaluations. With 
regards to protecting knowledge during collaboration, trust and non-disclosure agreements are 
more essential than patents. Joint research projects sometimes end up in shared patent 
applications, but because firms work hard to avoid joint patent applications, this option cannot 
be said to ease collaboration. An additional finding in the category of use of patents is that it is 
important for firms to ensure their freedom to operate, so they patent to avoid being excluded 
and to have technology to bargain with, if they end up in a situation where their research is 
blocked. The public research institutions are aware not to block themselves in their research by 
giving firms exclusive rights to technology within their core research fields.  
 
8.2 The impact of patenting on technology transfer 
 
There is no clear answer for whether or not the patents of public research institutions have a 
positive impact on technology transfer through collaboration with firms. In the case of the firms 
and institutions in this study patents do not play a significant part in technology transfer to 
industry, because the use of patents belong to the competitive strategies of firms, not to 
technology transfer. By transferring patented results to industry the public institutions are giving 
firms exclusive rights which they use in their navigation of the markets. In some cases, where 
the results are not central to the firm’s core technology and when the result requires significant 
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know-how and equipment that the firm does not have, the exclusive rights are restoring the 
incentives for firms to invest in the further development of the results. In other cases, where the 
technology is in line with the technological capabilities of the firm or where the investment costs 
and insecurity of the results are not very significant, granting a monopoly for a specific 
technology is leading to a welfare loss.  
 
The policy recommendation from this study is based on the findings on variation according to 
industry and types of research results. Some types of results need to be patented before industry 
is interested in commercialising them, others are just as useful when published openly, and then 
there is no need to allow for monopolies.   
 
8.3 The validity of the results and suggestions for further research 
 
I have shown that within the institutions and firms on which I base my study there is a 
significant variation in the use of patents. This variation is not linked to industries that involve 
chemical based knowledge, which the empirical studies discussed in Chapter 2 found vary from 
other industries. However there is a large share of both research results and firms that are 
connected to these industries. In the case of the research institutions I cannot say whether their 
results are typical of the whole range of patents from public research institutions, but as 
mentioned in Chapter 5 I talked to institutions representing a major share of the patents in the 
Copenhagen area. When it comes to firms it was the larger ones that I secured interviews with. 
Furthermore, the information about the use of patents was overall consistent from all the 
informants.  
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In spite of this, the relative weight of each of my findings cannot be determined. But the 
findings provide good indicators of where to begin further studies of patenting in the 
relationship between public research institutions and industry. The first task would be to find out 
which firms the research of public institutions is interesting for. Here it would be interesting to 
look at which industry they belong to, and whether large firms benefit more from the research 
than smaller. Secondly a study of the type of research results that firms will only use if they 
have exclusive rights is needed, in order to establish the cases where patenting has a positive 
impact on commercialisation.  
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Appendix I 
 
A. List of informants from TTOs and information about the institutions of which they are 
a part 
 
The information about the TTO and the public research institution in question is from the 
interview and from the webpage of the institution (see list of web pages in bibliography). The 
commercialisation results are from the evaluation of the act on patenting at public institutions. 
The numbers are from 2000-2003, and some informants stressed that the numbers have changed 
significantly (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, 2004).   
 
Informant 1:  
Claus Hansen, Head of secretariat, Patent and Contract Unit, Copenhagen Hospital 
Corporation (HS).  
 
Copenhagen Hospital Corporation is an association of public hospitals. They do research as part 
of their daily work and the Act on inventions applies to the employees at hospitals. The 
informant mentioned the results as relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, and collaborations 
with firms include testing of new drugs. The results were 33 patent applications, 6 licence 
agreements, 3 sold patents, 7 spin-outs.  
 
The interview was done by phone and not recorded.  
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Informant 2: 
Tina Lewis, Business Relations, Research and Innovation Office, The Royal Veterinary 
and Agricultural University (KVL) 
KVL has is a veterinary, agriculture and foods university. The patenting is within Pathological, 
i.e. cancer research (a fourth), plant biology, foods research, human nutrition and veterinary 
research. The TTO was founded in 2003. The results were 10 patent applications and no 
commercialisations, but according to the informant the results are now 19 patent applications 7 
licence agreements, 1 sold patent, 1 spin-out. 
 
 
Informant 3:  
Berit Moe Jensen, chief consultant, Risoe National Laboratory (Risoe) 
Risoe is a national laboratory (under The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation), 
which does research within sustainable energy supply and technology for the health sector. The 
patents are within: optics technology, laser technology, fuel cells, solar cells, wind turbines and 
bio-ethanol. The commercialisation results were 33 patent applications 20 licence agreements, 5 
sold patents, 2 spin-outs. According to the informant Risoe now has 64 patents or patent 
applications.  
Risoe is only partially publicly funded; less that half of their income comes from the ministry, 
their income is among other things from contract research with industry.    
 
Informant 4:  
Karen Laigaard, Head of Technology Transfer, Tech Trans Office at University of 
Copenhagen (KU) 
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The informant gave her information by written answers to the questions from the interview-
guide. The interview-guide was modified by adding more details to some questions and 
removing some of the less central ones.   
Copenhagen University does research and teaching within science, humanities and social 
sciences. The commercialisation results were 37 patent applications, 10 licence agreements, no 
sold patents or spin-outs. 
 
B. List of informants from firms and information about the firms they represent 
The information about each firm is taken from the interviews (see interview guide) and from the 
firm’s website (see list in Bibliography).  
 
Informant 5:  
Bernhard Seitz, Chief Patent Counsel, Haldor Topsoe A/S 
Haldor Topsoe is an Engineering firm, within heterogeneous catalysis. The list of industries 
served (www.haldortopsoe.com) is long, refining, chemicals and metallurgical industries are 
examples. The firm has approximately 1600 employees. 15 % of the turnover is invested in 
R&D; the firm has no significant income from patent-licences.  
 
Informant 6: 
Anette Hegner, IP Manager, NKT Research & Innovation A/S 
NKT Research an innovation is a small firm (19 employees). It has a research department and a 
department called Group IP. Group IP is an “in-house patent agency”, which handle the IPR 
issues of most of the firms in NKT Holding. The main work is for the smaller firms, most of 
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them are within the photonics business. One works with chemical modification of surfaces, and 
Nano-technology (polymers). Most of the firms are cash-burn firms, which invest heavily in 
technological development in areas where the market is low at present time. Some of the firms 
are start-ups and NKT research provides development assistance.  
The informant specified the industries to which the firms she was referring to belong, whenever 
this was relevant. One of the firms is a research firm which get its income from licences. None 
of the firms develop finished consumer products.  
 
 
Informant 7: 
Henrik Dalbøge, Senior Director, Biotech Business Development, Novozymes A/S  
Novozymes has approximately 4000 employees. The industry is biotech. The largest business 
area is industrial enzymes, for many different products for example foods and washing powder. 
The firm does not have a significant income from licensing. 13 % of the turnover is invested in 
R&D.  
 
Informant 8: 
Iben Haasum, Head of Patent Department, Chr. Hansen A/S  
Chr. Hansen has around 2500 employees. It is an ingredient firm; biotech is used in the 
development. The main areas of business are: lactic acid bacteria for dairy products and for mild 
pharmaceuticals, enzymes, colour products, and flavours. The investment in R&D is 6-7% of the 
turnover. The firm has an income from licensing, but it is not significant.  
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Appendix II 
 
 
A. Interview-guide, TTOs 
 
1. What kinds of agreements do you usually make with firms? 
 
2. How is the contact with the firms established? 
- Do you have contact with foreign firms?  
 
3. Are the firms, which contact you, interested in an exclusive licence? 
 
4. What is your impression of what the firms think of the conditions for licensing and 
collaboration agreements? 
 
5. Is it you impression that firms are interested in working with researchers that are behind a 
patented invention? 
 
6. Do you know of collaborations that started on the basis of a firm’s interest in patents? 
 
7. Do you know of researchers that are behind an invention who where hired as consultants? 
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8. Does the technology transfer happen in other ways than licensing, selling patents and spin-
out firms? 
 
9. Do firms often play a part in the patenting process? 
 
10. How will you characterize your current patent portfolio? For example within which fields of 
research? 
- How much further development do the inventions you apply for patents on require? 
- Are you inventions primarily product, method or usage patent? 
 
12. Do you file joint patent applications with firms? 
 
13. Is it your impression that firms prefer exclusive rights to patents? 
 
14. Which type of firms do you generally collaborate with? 
 
15. Can you give me names of firms you have had collaborations with, where patents were 
involved? 
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B. Interview-guide, firms 
 
Information about the firm 
 
Which industry are the main activities of the firm within? 
 
How much do you approximately invest in R&D (as a percentage of the turnover)? 
 
How many of your employees have a Ph.D. degree? 
 
Have you developed new products or techniques lately? 
 
Do you have a significant income form licensing? 
 
 
Collaboration with public research institutions 
 
 
1. What kinds of research collaborations do you have with universities, public research 
institutions and hospitals? 
- Were any of these with foreign research institutions?   
 
2. Have you bought patents or licenses from public research institutions?  
- Exclusive licences? 
 88 
 
3. Do you prefer to have personal contact with the researcher behind the invention? 
-If yes, what type? 
 
4. Are patents useful in some parts of the collaboration with public research institutions? 
 
- In identifying possible collaboration partners? 
 
- In protecting your own knowledge?   
 
-In sharing the results of a collaboration? 
 
 
Knowledge 
 
5. How do you search for new knowledge within your field of research?  
- Patent-databases? 
- Do you search through the patents of public research institutions?  
 
6. How do you identify potential collaboration partners?  
- Patents? 
- Publications? 
- The network of employees? 
- Is it done differently for collaborations with other firms than for public institutions? 
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7. Are the patents of public research institutions interesting for you? 
- Is the scientific level good enough? 
- Are they at the same level as patents of other firms? 
 
8. Do you get enough knowledge about an invention from a patent publication? 
 
9. Are patents more interesting than research results published in other ways? 
 
10. Are exclusive rights to an invention important? 
- If yes, is this because of the investment costs? 
 
11. How much further investment is needed to develop a patented research result into a 
product? 
- Is there a difference in how much further development is needed, depending on whether the 
result is from a public institution or a firm? 
 
Patents 
 
12. How important are patents to protect the knowledge you have developed? 
 
13. Do patents have other roles than protection? 
- Do they signal competences? 
- Are they used to share research results after joint research projects? 
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- Do you patent to be able to make cross-licensing agreements? 
- Do you patent results that you are not interested in developing yourself in order to block 
competitors from using it? 
 
 
 
 
 
